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Introduction1
Guided by the theological understanding that the Koranic message was delivered 
to be heard by human beings of all lands and ethnicities, and conscious of the historical 
spread of Islam from the Iberian peninsula to China and Southeast Asia, Muslim 
leaders have often called for the Islamic ummah (community) to unite to revive an 
Islamic political order. By the turn of the twentieth century, the pan-Islamic ideal had 
begun to be seen as a viable solution to Europe's domination over Muslim lands, in the 
Middle East as well as in the Indian subcontinent. Yet, as the Ottoman caliphate was 
slowly losing its authority, anti-colonialism came to be interpreted in nationalist terms, 
with pan-Islam playing only an occasional role to rally support for independence 
movements on the international level. Historical trajectories clearly show that pan- 
Islam, as a political project aimed at the creation of a transnational Islamic state, had 
already been abandoned in the Middle East before the abrogation of the Caliphate in 
1924. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that the debates and initiatives that 
followed the caliphate's collapse (often referred to as the "caliphate question"), and 
which were aimed at its revival, injected new life in pan-Islamic ideals, especially at the 
geographic peripheries of the Islamic world.
11 am most indebted to my supervisor, Professor William Gervase Clarence-Smith, for the long hours he 
dedicated to my PhD project and drafts. I am also grateful to Michael Feener (ARI, NUS), Michelle Tan 
(SEAP, NUS), and Eric Tagliacozzo, as well as the other editors and reviewers of Indonesia for their 
comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this article.
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This article begins with an assessment of the impact of such discussions (of both a 
pan-Islam movement and the caliphate collapse) on the Islamic anti-colonial 
movement in the Netherlands East Indies. Analyzing the politics of the Indies' Islamic 
party, Partai Sarekat Islam, and the writings of its prominent leader, S. M. 
Kartosuwiryo (1905-62), between 1928 and the 1950s, the following pages will address 
the question of how the pan-Islamic ideal interacted with nationalist aspirations. 
During the post-independence period, Kartosuwiryo distanced himself from the 
Indonesian Republic, establishing in 1949 the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam 
Indonesia, Nil). The Darul Islam (DI) was formed by Kartosuwiryo in West Java in 
1948, and in the early 1950s had expanded to Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South 
Kalimantan. As Sukarno shaped the unitary state of Indonesia in 1950-51, the DI 
became a political and military obstacle to the realization of such a project. The conflict 
between the Republican army and the Darul Islam continued until 1962, when 
Kartosuwiryo was arrested and executed as an enemy of the state, and 1965, when 
other regional leaders were arrested. The following pages examine Kartosuwiryo's 
approach to the threads connecting independence, the formation of a nation-state 
based on Islam, and the religious duty and desire to create an Islamic state unifying the 
whole Islamic ummah beyond national borders.2
Part 1: Java's Trans-Oceanic Connections in the Early Twentieth Century— 
Westernization and Islamization of the Anti-Colonial Movement
With the coming of the modern age, European mercantile expansion to Southeast 
Asia placed the Indonesian archipelago in a new position, whereby it received a steady 
flow of cultural inputs from Europe. Moreover, at the start of the nineteenth century, 
as the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC) went 
into bankruptcy and the Dutch government took control of its trading activities, the 
level of contact between Europe and Southeast Asia increased even further. Helped by 
a system of indirect rule, during the 1800s the Dutch colonial administration 
maintained as much distance as possible between "Europeans" and "Natives," but, 
after a hundred years of domination, the central government in The Hague called for a 
new assimilation, otherwise known as its "Ethical Policy." Aimed at uplifting the 
indigenous society, from 1901 until the end of colonial rule the Ethical Policy promoted 
education, tackled irrigation challenges, and reshaped emigration rules. A major 
outcome of the Ethical Policy was the dissemination of European history, politics, 
culture, and values among local elites through the expansion of Western-style 
schooling. Moreover, the Dutch ethici (advocates of the Ethical Policy) promoted the
2 The political career of Kartosuwiryo and the formation of his Islamic state ideology have been 
investigated by the author of this article in Chiara Formichi, "Kartosuwiryo's Role in the Creation of the 
Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia), 1927-1949" (PhD dissertation, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London, 2009). Previous scholarly publications addressing the Darul Islam 
movement are B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); 
HolkH. Dengel, Dartil-Islam: Kartosuwirjos KampfUm Einen Islamischen Staat Indonesien (Stuttgart: Steiner 
Verlag Wiesbaden, 1986); Hiroko Horikoshi, "The Dar-Ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1942-62): An 
Experience in the Historical Process," Indonesia 20 (October 1975): 59-86; Karl D. Jackson, Traditional 
Authority and National Integration: Darul Islam in West Java (Berkley, CA, and London: University of 
California Press, 1980[1971]); C. A. O. Nieuwenhuijze, "The Darul Islam Movement in Western Java," 
Pacific Affairs 23,2 (1950): 169-83; and Cornelis Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam 
in Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV, 1981).
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pursuit of higher education in the Netherlands (notably to Amsterdam and Leiden), 
further exposing this new indigenous intelligentsia to ideas of self-determination, 
nationalism, workers' unions, and students' organizations.3
At the same time as this European influence was growing, another connection had 
been developing, which placed Java and Sumatra within networks of Islamic authority, 
education, and political activism. Advances in seafaring greatly increased the flow of 
fawis to the holy places of Islam. Jawis, the collective name used in the Middle East to 
describe Southeast Asian Muslims, had been undertaking the journey to the Arabian 
Peninsula for centuries, but in the first quarter of the twentieth century the number of 
Jawi pilgrims increased dramatically.4 It had been a long-established tradition that 
pilgrims would extend their stay in the region to meet other Muslims who came from 
different corners of the world, to exchange experiences and opinions, and to share their 
knowledge about religious matters. After centuries of Mecca's superiority as a center of 
learning—at the end of the 1800s, approximately 5,000 Jawis were based there5—Egypt 
slowly overtook Mecca as a favorite destination for Southeast Asian Muslims. If in 1912 
there were only twelve Jawis in Cairo,6 in 1919 there were roughly fifty or sixty 
Indonesians, and by 1925 over two hundred Southeast Asian students were living in 
the Egyptian capital.7 Two factors played a crucial role in this shift of preference: first, 
the victory of Ibn Saud, who, being supported by 'Abd al-Wahhab, was seen as 
opposed to the "acculturated" stream of Islam practiced in Asia;8 9 and, second, 
Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida's (1865-1935) development of 
Islamic modernism attracted increasing numbers of students to al-Azhar University.4
While some sectors of the population in the Netherlands were inveighing against 
the capitalist system, and while other Europeans were engaged in anti-imperialist 
debates, Muslims in Mecca and Cairo discussed the issue of independence from 
"infidel" colonial rule and the possibility of establishing a transnational Islamic state. 
The ongoing anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist debates were not perceived as a threat by
3 R. Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1960), chapter two, is 
still the most exhaustive treatment of the Ethical Policy and the formation of an indigenous intelligentsia 
in the early twentieth century. Specifically on Ethici and Islam, see Michael F. Laffan, Islamic Nationhood 
and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds (London: Routledge, 2003).
4 Michael Feener, "New Networks and New Knowledge: Migrations, Communications, and the 
Refiguration of the Muslim Community in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, in The New 
Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 6, ed. Robert Hefner (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
pp. 39-68.
5 Z. Dhofier, "The Intellectualisation of Islamic Studies in Indonesia," Indonesia Circle 58 (1992): 21.
6 Michael F. Laffan, "An Indonesian Community in Cairo: Continuity and Change in a Cosmopolitan 
Islamic Milieu," Indonesia 77 (April 2004): 7.
' William R. Roff, "Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920s," Indonesia 9 (April 1970): 74.
8 The Emir Ibn Sa'ud began the reconquest of Hejaz in 1902 by occupying Riyadh and conquering the 
whole region of Nejed by 1906. In 1913, he invaded the region of Hasa, and in 1912 he invaded Jebel 
Sammar. In 1924, he managed to expel Sharif Hussein b. Ali from Mecca, and between 1925 and 1926 he 
triumphed in Medina and Asir. The new territories were unified in 1934 under the name "Saudi Arabia." 
Two years later, Ibn Sa'ud proclaimed himself King of Nejed and Hejaz.
9 See Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia (Honolulu, HI: University of 
Hawai'i Press, 2004). Among several pieces published on this topic, M. C. Ricklefs's Polarizing Javanese 
Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830-1930) (Singapore: NUS, 2007), pp. 57-74, offers a valid overview 
of the dynamics and data involved in the Middle East-Java connection. The formation of a self-conscious 
religious intelligentsia in Java and Sumatra resulting from this network has been thoroughly examined in 
Laffan's Islamic Nationhood.
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colonial governments, but, rather, as a source of intellectual enrichment for indigenous 
populations.10 Yet, the pilgrimage and the spread of pan-Islamic ideas were not 
accepted by the authorities as innocuous. Afraid of pan-Islamic trends, and believing 
that the pilgrimage had the power of transforming "peaceful Indonesian hajjis into 
rebellious fanatics,"11 the East Indies government hampered the performance of the 
pilgrimage. Such interference lasted until the turn of the century, when Christiaan 
Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) was installed in Batavia as Adviser for Arabic and 
Native Affairs. A highly esteemed scholar of Islam, Snouck was successful in arguing 
that the pan-Islamic threat was non-existent, as the Caliph himself had "deposited it 
[pan-Islam] in the museum of political antiquities."12 Also, Snouck maintained that the 
Indies Muslims were neither fanatics nor enemies of European rule, and, based on his 
own experience in Mecca, he concluded that "the holy city was certainly not the hotbed 
of any anti-colonial conspiracy."13 What Snouck could not predict was the impact that 
the abrogation of the Ottoman caliphate would have on the Indies Muslims in the 
1920s, and the consequent polarization of Islamic intelligentsia and Westernized 
secular nationalists.
In the mid-1920s, politicians of the caliber of Sukarno (1901-70) and H. O. S. 
Cokroaminoto (1882-1934), leaders of, respectively, the secular Perserikatan Nasional 
Indonesia (the early embodiment of Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI, or Indonesian 
National Party, established in 1928) and the religious nationalist movement Sarekat 
Islam (established around 1911-12), dedicated most of their political efforts to uniting 
the anti-colonial front. This attempt was pursued by reducing ideological differences 
and highlighting the common ground shared by nationalism, Islam, and socialism.14 As 
Sukarno advocated the common origin of these ideologies and their shared opposition 
to foreign domination, Cokroaminoto focused instead on the internationalist strategies 
of Islam and socialism. Although in the beginning Cokroaminoto did not promote pan- 
Islamic ideals, under the influence of Sarekat Islam's "second-in-chief' Haji Agus 
Salim (1884-1954), Cokroaminoto came to realize the political benefit of connecting the 
Indonesian struggle to a wider movement, as it provided the party with additional 
strength in a moment of crisis. So it was that by 1930 he had fully embraced this idea.15
The Emergence of Pan-Islam and the Abolition of the Caliphate
Prior to discussing the relationship between Islamic nationalism and pan-Islam in 
the Netherlands East Indies, it is appropriate to define briefly the origins of pan- 
Islamic ideas, and how they spread from 1860s Turkey to 1920s Indonesia. Pan-Islam
10 Van Niel, The Emergence, p. 57.
11 Harry Jindrich Benda, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in 
Indonesia," The Journal of Modern History 30 (1958): 86.
12 Benda, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, p. 86.
13 Martin van Bruinessen, "Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question," Studia Islaniika 
2,3 (1995): 117.
14 See Umar Said Cokroaminoto, Islam dan Sosialisme (Yogyakarta: Tride, 2003 [1924]); and Sukarno, 
"Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme," in Dibaivah Bendera Revolusi (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah 
Bendera Revolusi, 1926).
15 See the analysis of "Persatuan Ummat Islam se-Dunia," Fadjar Asia (January 21,1930, p. 1), which is part 
of "Keterangan Asas Partij Sarekat Islam Indonesia."
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was developed as a political concept by the Young Ottomans in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and was intended to match European ideas of pan-Slavism, pan- 
Hellenism, and the like, in an attempt to unify the Islamic community under the 
authority of the Ottoman sultan.16
The term was soon taken up by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97) and Muhammad 
'Abduh; as the Ottoman term ittihad-i Islam ("unity of Islam") was translated into 
Arabic as al-Wahda al-Islamiyya, the change of context also induced a subtle shift from 
advocating geo-political unity to religious unity. Pan-Islam came to signify that all 
Muslim peoples should cooperate with each other in their individual efforts to gain 
independence from infidel rule, and, possibly (but not necessarily), unite eventually 
under a single spiritual and political leadership.17 This is what Nikki Keddie defined as 
"proto-nationalism," a movement built upon a mixture of anti-imperialism and Islamic 
ecumenical sentiments.18 If Afghani had left a breach open for some sort of political 
unity, in his later years 'Abduh narrowed the interpretation of this concept to a purely 
religious vision of pan-Islam, focusing on the feeling of belonging to one community 
and excluding aspirations for geographical unification.19 His disciple Rashid Rida, 
though, kept swinging between concepts of "religious brotherhood" (as his articles in 
the early issues of al-Manar testify) and the need for a caliphate that would combine 
spiritual and temporal authority, Islam being the unity of al-dln wa al-dawla20 ("religion 
and government"). Later, a similar approach was taken up by Hasan al-Banna (1906- 
49), founder of the Ikhwanul Muslimln (Islamic Brotherhood) in Egypt, and an 
advocate of pan-Islamic nationalism. This debate reached Muslims across the 
Netherlands East Indies through the flow of pilgrims and students returning from their 
stay in the Middle East, the distribution of Arab newspapers, and a flourishing local 
press. The greatest impact was probably affected by al-Azhar University's periodical, 
al-Manar, but local journals such as al-Imam (Singapore), Seruan Azhar (Batavia and 
Cairo), and al-Irshad (Surabaya) also played an important role.21 As the powers of the 
Ottoman sultan were gradually reduced and pan-Islamic activities were heavily 
curtailed, the Young Turks' leadership found this ideology valuable to rally external 
support for their new regime. In 1913, the Committee of Union and Progress formed a 
pan-Islamic league in Istanbul, the Benevolent Islamic Society, which gathered Turks, 
Egyptians, Tunisians, Arabs from Yemen and the Hejaz, and Indians.22 As the Middle
16 This outline follows Jacob M. Landau, The Politics o f Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organisation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994).
17 Ibid., pp. 14-18.
18 Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," The Journal o f Modern History 41,1 (1969): 17-28.
19 Landau, The Politics o f Pan-Islam, pp. 25-27.
20 Muhammad Rashid Rida, Le Califat dans la Doctrine de RasTd Rida: Traduction Annotee d'al-JTilafa au al­
lmama al- 'uzrna (Le Califat ou I'lmama Supreme), vol. 6, trans. Henri Laoust, Me moires de Tinstitutfrancais de 
Damas (Beirut: Institut Frangais de Damas, 1938).
21 A recent discussion of the impact of al-Manar and the development of a Modernist press in the Indies is 
in Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, pp. 142-51, but the subject had already been examined in passim by W. R.
Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), and in 
more detail by Jutta E. Bluhm, "A Preliminary Statement on the Dialogue Established between the Reform 
Magazine Al-Manar and the Malayo-Indonesian World," Indonesia Circle 32 (1983): 37-38; and by Natalie 
Mobini-Kesheh, "The Arab Periodicals of the Netherlands East Indies," Bijdragen min het Koninklijk 
Instituut voorlndische Taal-, Lind- en Volkenkunde 152,11 (1996): 236-56.
22 Landau, The Politics o f Pan-Islam, pp. 86-92.
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East was hit by the internal dismantlement of the caliphal institution and the external 
fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, throughout the 1920s pan-Arabism and 
nationalism began to enjoy wider support than pan-Islam in the region. Yet it is at this 
historical juncture that Muslims at the periphery of the Islamic world began to play a 
crucial role in the revival of the Caliphate.23
As a minority that had served as the ruling class for centuries, Indian Muslims had 
been juggling with ideas of political Islam since the sixteenth century. At the turn of 
the twentieth century, pan-Islam in the subcontinent enjoyed a new wave of support, 
to the extent that a request was placed at the Sublime Porte for a consul to be 
appointed in Calcutta. Thanks to a thriving press, and the circulation of English- 
language materials, India's Muslims were aware of the politics affecting the Ottoman 
Empire, and followed the intellectual debate on pan-Islam. It is interesting to note that 
Landau sees pan-Islam in this context as mostly bearing a nationalist significance, in 
the sense that the existence of a transnational Islamic state was perceived as a 
guarantee for the survival and well-being of India's Muslim minority. Despite the wide 
internal support for the Khilafat Committee—its conference in 1919 was attended by 
several Sunni leaders, but also Shi'is, Ahmadis, and Mahatma Gandhi—the pan- 
Islamic agenda was gradually transformed into a nationalist one with the fall of the 
caliphate in 1924.24
The activities of the Khilafat movement stirred admiration from across the Muslim 
world, and in 1925 the al-Islam congress in Yogyakarta decided that an envoy would 
be sent to India to establish relations with the Central Khilafat Committee. In 1924, 
Partai Sarekat Islam leaders had already established in Surabaya a Central Comite 
Chilafat, and later that year the same city hosted the al-Islam congress, aimed at 
discussing how to approach the caliphate question. Eventually, Cokroaminoto 
attended the Meccan Mu'tamar 'Alam Islami in 1926, and Haji Agus Salim was sent as 
the Indies' delegate in 1927.25
The fact that the caliphate question began to gain support in the Indies only in the 
1920s, when the rest of the Islamic world was shifting from pan-Islam to nationalism, is 
a circumstance that should be analyzed in conjunction with the state of political 
activism in the archipelago. What must be borne in mind, then, is that before the 1920s 
the Indies' anti-colonial movement was not yet ideologically defined. I am here 
suggesting that the Indonesian nationalist movement emerged with all its ramifications 
as a result of a transformation that took place in the 1910s. Accepting the fact that the 
first organizations to advocate independence from colonial rule were Budi Utomo 
(established in 1908, and representing the aristocratic priyayi elite) and Sarekat Dagang 
Islam (established in 1905 to protect the commercial interests of Muslim batik traders, 
later to become the Sarekat Islam party), the argument follows that the nationalist 
movement, per se, emerged from fractures within and conglomerations involving these
23 For more on the Khilafat movement, see A. C. Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1924 (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1972); and S. Oliver-Dee, The Caliphate Question: The British Government and Islamic 
Governance (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).
24 Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam, pp. 86-92.
23 Amelz, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto: hidup dan perdjuangannja (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), pp. 163-151,174. 
And for an extensive investigation of the Indies' Muslims' reaction to the abrogation of the caliphate, see 
Bruinessen, "Muslims of the Dutch East Indies."
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first groups, a reshaping that occurred along ideological lines. This process of 
diversification from a general idea of "indigenous advancement" to the formation of 
well-defined Islamic, communist, and nationalist parties, with agendas molded 
according to domestic needs and international models, passed through a transitional 
period in which each organization had multiple political souls. Just as Sarekat Islam 
had split into a socialist and an Islamic wing in the mid-1920s—and support for the 
party had begun to decline—the caliphate issue, the Islamic state ideal, and the pan- 
Islamic project quickly became important elements in rallying support among Indies 
Muslims. Appeals to a transnational network of alliances functioned to strengthen the 
party's position against Sukarno's nationalism and Semaun's socialism. The case for 
the achievement of independence from colonial rule as part of a transnational 
movement was made even stronger by the argument that striving for the unity of the 
ummah was seen as a religious duty.
Part 2: The 1920s and 1930s—From Islamic Nationalism to Pan-Islam
Kartosuwiryo on Islam and Nationalism
Scholars of colonial Indonesia, in particular Takashi Shiraishi, have argued that by 
the mid-1920s political Islam in the East Indies was in steep decline, with communism 
and secular nationalism taking its place among the indigenous population.261 contend, 
however, that although Sarekat Islam had been seriously weakened by the split 
between the religious and the communist wings, and by the soaring enthusiasm for 
Sukarno's Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia, the Islamic party did not decline but 
instead entered a new phase. The focus was no longer on relieving the indigenous 
population from colonial mistreatments, but rather on laying out the platform for an 
independent state of Indonesia based on Islamic precepts. And it should be added that 
this shift was possible mostly because of Haji Agus Salim's dedication to the caliphate 
question, and his increasing influence on drawing the party's agenda.
Kartosuwiryo joined the Islamic party at a moment of shifting balances, and 
although he had been Cokroaminoto's personal assistant and protege since his 
entrance into Sarekat Islam, Agus Salim had a greater impact than Cokroaminoto on 
Kartosuwiryo's political vision. Born in a village at the border between East and 
Central Java (Cepu) in 1905 as the son of a low-ranking colonial-government employee, 
Kartosuwiryo attended Dutch schools up to the Nederlands Indische Artsen School 
(Netherlands Indies Doctors' School) in Surabaya. After being expelled for dabbling 
with communist activism, he joined the Islamic nationalist party (Partai Sarekat Islam) 
in 1927. Kartosuwiryo emerged as a prolific, yet controversial, journalist for the PSI 
newspaper Fadjar Asia, and in less than a decade he had become secretary of the party's 
executive committee, chairman of the West Java branch, and vice-president of the 
central board. In the first year of his contributing to Fadjar Asia, Kartosuwiryo's articles 
show the double influence of Cokroaminoto and Salim, but by late 1929 his religious 
commitment emerges as predominant. On the pages of Fadjar Asia he advocated, as 
foundations of the anti-colonial struggle, political non-cooperation with the Dutch and 
the establishment of a state based on Islamic principles and jurisprudence. As the
26 Takashi Shiraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926 (Ithaca, NY, and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1990).
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nationalist struggle unfolded, Kartosuwiryo continued to express his commitment to 
an Islamic vision of an independent state of Indonesia, and the tension between 
nationalism and pan-Islamism kept surfacing in his writings until the 1950s.
Kartosuwiryo first raised the issue of Islamic transnationalism in July 1928, when 
he was entangled in the already mentioned debate on socialism and Islam, initiated in 
1924 by Cokroaminoto and continued in 1926 by Sukarno. Arguing for Islam's 
primacy, Kartosuwiryo pointed to the socio-political dimension of the hajj pilgrimage, 
which made it a physical manifestation of Islam's brotherhood that crossed boundaries 
of ethnicity, language, and nations.27 The term "pan-Islam" appears for the first time in 
late September 1928, when commenting on the colonial authorities' mismanagement of 
justice, Kartosuwiryo calls for Indonesian Muslims to "wake up" and join the one 
organization, PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Islamic Union Party of Indonesia), 
that defends the people and is ready to sacrifice itself to ensure its top priority, pan- 
Islamism: "our movement dedicates each and every bone of its body to Pan- 
Islamisme.”28 As appears clear in subsequent articles, at this point in time Kartosuwiryo 
saw pan-Islam not as a goal per se, but rather as a political tool. I am not suggesting 
that Sarekat Islam was instrumentalizing pan-Islam as an element of its political 
propaganda, but rather that the idea of a global community united by the same 
religious beliefs and striving for the same rights to freedom from foreign domination 
was considered a powerful rallying point for political action. It took a few more years 
before Kartosuwiryo developed a vision of pan-Islam as the final goal of his struggle, 
then represented by the creation of what can be called a "transnational political entity," 
namely, a state based on Islamic laws and unifying the ummah worldwide.
Despite the existence of several secular political parties that proclaimed themselves 
to be "inter-Asiatic," to Kartosuwiryo only Islam called for pure and genuine 
cooperation across borders, because this effort was inspired by religion rather than 
political opportunism. Showing how difficult it was to balance nationalism and pan- 
Islam intellectually, Kartosuwiryo also added that an additional function of Islamic 
internationalism, also known as inter-Islamism, was the creation of a network of 
Islamic countries that desired to cooperate with each other on the road to nationalism.29 
This apparent contradiction, which recalls the ideological shift in the Indian Khilafat 
movement, soon attracted the attention of the nationalist newspaper Keng Po (a 
Chinese-owned daily paper printed in Batavia). In November 1928, its editorial argued 
that "in Islam there is neither Nationalism nor Internationalism." But this polemic, 
instead of harming the Islamic faction, became an ideal platform for Fadjar Asia to use 
to enlighten its readership further concerning the political duties of Muslims. 
Kartosuwiryo's argument was twofold, as, on the one hand, he proved Islam's 
commitment to nationalism by invoking the Prophet's saying, "love for the homeland 
is a part of faith" (id. Cinta akan tanah tumpah darah itu adalah sebagian daripada iman). On 
the other hand, Kartosuwiryo pointed to the struggle to become "one ummah” as the 
theorization of internationalism, and to the duty to perform pilgrimage as the 
"broadest, purest, and holiest" manifestation of that struggle. Kartosuwiryo thus 
concluded that secular nationalists did not fully understand the complexity of Islamic
27 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Perdjalanan ketanah Soetji," Fadjar Asia, July 20,1928.
28 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Aniajaan dan Siksaan," Fadjar Asia, September 26,1928.
29 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Pertjaja kepada diri sendiri dan ...," Fadjar Asia, October 31,1928.
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nationalism, which was aimed not at the freedom and promotion of one people, one 
race, or one kingdom, but was instead pursued for the prosperity of "the One God, 
One Belief, One Prophet, One Flag" of Islam.30
Kartosuwiryo's articles published in 1929 focused on domestic politics, but as the 
debate among indigenous parties intensified, Kartosuwiryo offered his reflections on 
the different characteristics of nationalist ideologies in the Indies. In Islam dan 
Nasionalisme, Kartosuwiryo succeeded in balancing his warnings that national pride 
might result in confrontations among different nations with preserving the notion that 
one should love the motherland. To avoid this potentially "deviationist attitude," 
Kartosuwiryo argued that patriotism should follow the model of Monotheism, and 
thus be directed towards what he called "Mono-Humanisme," a term here used to define 
"the unity of the human race to become one ummah" (persatoean manoesia mendjadi satoe 
Oemmat). As Islam is "not just a way to establish relations between humans and God," 
but it can guide relations between humans, organizations, and so forth, then it can help 
shape a wider concept of nationality (kebangsaan) that is not limited to its "usual 
understanding."31 A couple of months later, Kartosuwiryo explained these differences, 
contributing to the debate on how nationhood was perceived under colonial rule. In 
this article Kartosuwiryo explains that for Budi Utomo, it is "Javanese nationalism"; for 
Sukarno's PNI, it is "pan-Asianism"; but for himself and the PSII, kebangsaan was to be 
interpreted differently, not to be linked to worldly desires or limited by any territorial 
borders. It was instead wide and broad, and only connected to religious belonging and 
to the unity of Islam; Islamic nationalism was only dedicated to the prosperity of 
God.32 Although limited, these comments show Kartosuwiryo's understanding of 
nationalism as a feeling of being solely guided by religion and aimed at the 
establishment of a borderless Islamic nation.
PSII's Struggle for the Unity of the Islamic Ummah across the World
By 1930, Sarekat Islam had changed its nature from being an Islamo-socialist 
organization to an Islamic party committed to pan-Islam. Between October 1929 and 
January 1930, the PSII executive committee edited the party's constitution by including 
a new first article titled Persatoean dalam Oemmat Islam (Unity in the Islamic 
Community). There it was stated that the unity of Indonesian Muslims was "a step 
towards the unity of the Islamic community across the world," and the section on 
national freedom thus became the second article of the Keterangan Asas (Foundation 
Statement). This concept of Indonesian Muslims' unity being one aspect of the 
worldwide unity of the ummah was then repeated in the first and second articles of the 
constitution, titled Persatoean Pergerakan dan Organisatie (Unity of the Movement and 
Organization) and Toedjoean (Aims), respectively.33
30 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Islamisme, Nasionalisme dan Internasionalisme I," Fadjar Asia, November 3 ,192S; 
and "Islamisme, Nasionalisme dan Internasionalisme II," Fadjar Asia, November 7,1928. Quote from Keng 
Po and Koranic verse (in Indonesian) included in: Kartosuwiryo, "Islamisme, Nasionalisme dan 
Internasionalisme I."
31 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Islam dan Nasionalisme," Fadjar Asia, May 24,1929.
32 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Berekor Pandjang," Fadjar Asia, July 2, 1929.
33 "Persatuan Ummat Islam se-Dunia," Fadjar Asia, January 21,1930.
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Thus, in the short time between 1928 and 1930, Sarekat Islam and Kartosuwiryo 
had completed the shift from viewing pan-Islam as an ideology useful for gathering 
the necessary support and strength to achieve Indonesia's national independence, to 
advocating Islamic nationalism as a step towards the worldwide unification of the 
ummah. The sources do not offer any insight on why such a change occurred so rapidly 
at this point in time; however, I would like to offer one interpretation, which looks at 
the Islamic party in the wider context of Indonesian domestic politics at the turn of the 
decade. By 1930, the cooperative efforts to unite the deeply fragmented Indonesian 
anti-colonial movement had failed, as eventually PSII withdrew its support from the 
PPPKI (Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia, Agreement of 
Indonesian People's Political Association), and PSII prepared the ground to go its own 
way. Following Sukarno's arrest in 1929, the PNI had gradually disintegrated, and the 
labor union movement had incurred the same fate, as Tjipto Mangunkusumo, the 
leader of the movement, had been sent into exile in 1928. In 1931, the colonial 
government had appointed as new governor-general the former Minister of War 
Bonifacius de Jonge, a conservative politician openly opposed to any move towards 
Indonesian self-government. I suggest that, at a time when the nationalist movement 
had lost most of its leadership and momentum, Sarekat Islam leaders chose to appeal 
to a greater goal than achieving self-rule, a goal that was sanctioned in the scriptures as 
a religious duty, in order to stir a new wave of enthusiasm among its followers. As a 
result, the achievement of the unity of the Islamic community became the first priority 
of the Islamic party.
Following this shift, the decade of the 1930s was marked by an increased 
politicization of Islam in the Sarekat Islam party, and a deepening of its commitment to 
the international cause of Islam. Cokroaminoto opened the 1931 congress with a quote 
from Mohammad Ali of the British-Indies Khilafat Committee: "It is a wrong 
conception of religion that you have if you exclude politics from it; it is not dogma, it is 
not ritual."34 This congress was more outward-oriented than previous ones, as the 
issues regarding India, Palestine, and the Berbers of Morocco were discussed at length, 
and two motions in support of the respective Muslim factions were passed. While PSII 
considered political developments affecting Muslim communities in the wider Islamic 
world, events in the Indies were attracting the attention of Muslim leaders in the 
Middle East. For example, Sayed Amin al-Husaini of Palestine had sent a telegram to 
Cokroaminoto to discuss the situation in Palestine, but also to condemn Sukarno's PNI 
for its secularism.35
The decline of Partai Sarekat Islam, which had already begun in the 1920s 
consequent to the split between the Islamic and communist wings and the 
imprisonment of several leading figures in the aftermath of the 1926 uprisings, reached 
its nadir in the mid-1930s, exacerbated by the internal conflict concerning the 
noncooperation policy. This policy, which advocated the pursuing of Indonesia's 
independence without cooperating with the colonial authorities, had been
34 "17e Nationaal Congres van de Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia" [June 23,1931], Archief van het 
Ministerie vanKolonien [hereafter AMK], 1901-1940: Kabinet Verbaal Geheim [hereafter KVGeh] no.368, 
Nationaal Archief, The Hague [hereafter NA].
35 "Verslag van het 17de Congres der Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia" [April 11,1931], AMK, 1901-1940: 
KVGeh no. 368, NA.
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implemented and withdrawn several times by both nationalist and Islamic groups 
since the establishment of the Volksraad in 1917; however, by the 1930s, Sukarno had 
abandoned this approach, while Kartosuwiryo had made it the core of his anti-colonial 
struggle. Reinterpreted in Islamic terms, noncooperation became hijrah, referring to 
Muhammad's "migration" from Mecca to Medina in the year 622, and thus 
symbolizing the beginning of a new era solely inspired by Islam. Since Cokroaminoto's 
death in 1934, the fragile balance of PSII's leadership had collapsed under the tensions 
between Kartosuwiryo and Agus Salim, the new leaders of the party's directorate.36 
Kartosuwiryo was commissioned to write a pamphlet elucidating the theoretical 
underpinnings and political implications of the noncooperation policy, and as 
Kartosuwiryo's booklet, "Sikap Hijrah Partai Sarekat Islam," was distributed at the 
twenty-second party congress in September 1936, it stirred a final confrontation with 
Salim.37
As far as PSII's transnational effort is concerned, there are two instances showing 
the interest of the party's executive to be part of a worldwide Islamic community. First, 
when describing the spread of the Islamic world in 1930 ("Doenia Islam Tahoen 1930" 
[Islamic World in the Year 1930], introduction to volume one), the map showing the 
Islamic territory includes North Africa, the Middle East, the area around the Bosporus, 
Persia, and Afghanistan, but also large parts of Russia (Central Asia), India, the area 
around the Gulf of Bengal, the Indo-Malay region, the area north of Vietnam, and an 
area overlapping the China-Mongolia border. Second, in the subsequent volume of the 
booklet, one of the political goals of the Program Tandzim of PSII is defined as
... building brotherly relations with Islamic communities in other nations in 
order to increase the meetings and eventually build a Persatoean Oemmat Islam se- 
Doenia [unity of the Islamic community worldwide] [...] besides that PSII feels 
responsible to build relations with other Islamic ummahs in other countries, in 
order to achieve a worldwide unity of the Islamic community. Such are the 
demands of a strong belief in Pan-Islam that stirs the desire to bring together all 
the Muslim communities of the world to become one Muslim Community that 
does not want to split apart or to be divided.38
This pledge to support pan-Islam had already been expressed in August through a 
press communique directed at "seeking] and get[ting] connections with Muslim- 
Communities outside our own Country," and in which the PSII presented itself as
... the first political party in Indonesia based on a religious foundation [...] [T]he 
first step is to get connections with the press in various Muslim countries, by 
whose intermediaries it may well be hoped that our voice, the voice of the
36 Maklumat H.Agoes Salim, Abikoesno, dan Kartosowirjo, Ma'lumat No. 33, Ladjnah Tanfidzjah PSII Kepada 
terhormat seluruh Ladjnah Afdeeling PSII, Jakarta, December 17,1934, in Amelz, H.O.S. Tjokroarninoto, pp. 
146-48.
37 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Sikap Hidjrah P.S.I.I." (Madjlis Tahkim Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia ke-22:
1936), Chapter 3.
38 Ibid.
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thousands who are united in our party in an isolated Muslim land, may be heard 
by our co-religionalists in those far-off countries.39
Expressing his take on the hijrah debate on the pages of the periodical Pergerakan,40 
in late 1936 Salim stated that he was not any longer ready to work within the party if 
this meant conflict with the colonial government.41 Feeling marginalized in his 
cooperative efforts, Salim decided to leave PSII and establish a new faction, the Komite 
Penyadar PSII (PSII Awareness Committee).42 The year 1937 was a troubled one for 
Kartosuwiryo's leadership; the colonial authorities reported that at least twenty-one 
branches of PSII had manifested their discontent towards the hijrah policy, with some 
passing their allegiance to the Komite Penyadar,43 and that only seventy branches out 
of 131 participated at the Bandung Congress (July 22-23, 1937).44 However, from the 
prologue to the 1940 pamphlet "Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah," it appears that the Bandung 
Congress had chosen Kartosuwiryo as chairman of the committee in charge of 
compiling a new pamphlet, and that a draft had already been approved by the 1938 
congress in Surabaya.45 46Nevertheless, by January 1939, PSII's central board expelled 
many members in the Garut area (West Java), based on the rumor that, under 
Kartosuwiryo's leadership, some PSII branches in West Java had shifted away from 
party interests and were instead propagating mystic teachings.45 The Overzicht van de 
Inlandsche en Maleisisch-Chineesch Pers ("Summary of the Native and Malay-Chinese 
Press") reported that PSII's executive committee had found in Kartosuwiryo's hijrah 
pamphlet the foundation of a Sufi tariqa ("order"), fully in conflict with PSII principles 
and Islam in general, and as he refused to stop the reprinting of the brochure, 
Kartosuwiryo was expelled.47
The "Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah PSII" was printed in Malangbong (Garut, West Java) 
in March 1940, but neither in the prologue nor in the main text is there any mention of 
the fracture between PSII and Kartosuwiryo's Komite Pertahanan Kebenaran-PSII 
(Committee for the Defense of the Truth, KPK-PSII), suggesting that the pamphlet had 
been written before, but printed after, the split. Reasserting several of the concepts
39 "Contact PSII met het buitenland" [August 13,1936], AMK, 1900-1963: Geheime Mailrapporten 
[hereafter GMr], 1914—1952 no. 146, NA. [English in the original].
40 "De PSII Brochures 'Hidjrah'" [January 18,1937], AMK, 1900-1963: GMr, 1914-1952 no. 150, NA.
41 "Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisisch-Chineesch Pers", ed. Bureau voor de Volkslectuur en 
Aanverwante Aangele (Weltevreden: Drukkerij Volkslectuur), August 22,1936.
42 "Vergadering van het "Comite Penjadar Barisan PSII" te Batavia op Februari 1937" [February 28,1937], 
Algemeen Rijksarchief: Rapportage Indonesie 1945-1950 no. 306, NA.
43 Overzicht, January 30,1937.
44 See "Congres PSII te Bandoeng Juli 1937" [August 9,1937], AMK, 1900-1963: GMr, 1914-1952 no. 152, 
NA; and "Verslag van de openbare zittingen en de openbare vergadering van het Drie-en-twintigate 
Congres van de Partij Sjarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), gehouden te Bandoeng, van 19 tot 25 Juli 1937," in 
"Congres P(artij) S(jarikat) I(slam) I(ndonesia) te Bandoeng, Juli 1937" [September 17,1937], AMK, 1900- 
1963: GMr, 1914-1952 no. 153, NA.
45 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Daftar-Oesaha Hidjrah PSII bagian Muqaddima," 1 ed. (Malangbong [SS W/L] 
Java: Poestaka Dar-oel4slam, March 1940), reprinted in Al-Chaidar, Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara 
Islam Indonesia S. M. Kartosoeunrjo: Fakta Dan Data Sejarah Darul Islam (Jakarta: Darul Jalah, 1999), pp. 461- 
76.
46 A. Harry Poeze, ed., Politiek-Politioneele Overzichten van Nederlandsch-Indie, 1935-1941, vol. IV (Leiden: 
KITLV Uitgeverij, 1994 [January 1939]), p. 257.
47 Overzicht, June 17,1939.
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already proposed in the past decade, Kartosuwiryo focused on the necessity to pursue 
pan-Islam, implement shari'a, and reunite agama dan dunia (din wa dawla, religion and 
government) to ensure the improvement of the status of the Indonesian people. 
Chapter six of the pamphlet is titled Persatoean Manoesia dan Kesatoean Allah (Unity of 
Humanity and Oneness of God), with the subtitle Al-lttihad-oel-lslam dan Wahdaniyat 
Allah (Unity of Islam and Oneness of God), and summarizes the terminology used to 
define the concept of Islamic unity. In this chapter, Kartosuwiryo argues that PSII's 
goal of unifying the Islamic world, here addressed as Persatoean Doenia Islam and Daroel 
Islam (Abode of Islam), could only be achieved after humanity had dedicated itself to 
being fully devoted to God. It is this very pillar of Islam that, in Kartosuwiryo's view, 
represents the key
... to achieve a) the perfect unity of the Islamic world, internally as well as 
externally; b) unity among Muslims; c) equality among human beings of all social 
levels before and outside the law, equality in international relations, and between 
one ummah and the other ummahs ...48
Kartosuwiryo concluded that the ultimate stage of this process would have thus been 
the building of a new world, the doenia baroe, and of an Islamic world, the Dar-oel-Islam, 
Daroel-Falah, or Dar-oel-Fatah.49
On the eve of the Japanese invasion, Kartosuwiryo was fully dedicated to the pan- 
Islamic project of bringing together the Islamic ummah from around the world within 
the framework of an Islamic state. It is important to note that, in these writings, the 
spiritual unity of the ummah, the al-Ittihad-oel-Islam, Doenia Islam, Doenia Baroe, Dar-oel- 
Islam, Daroel-Falah, or Dar-oel-Fatah is constantly reconnected to the necessity to 
implement shari'a law and obtain the physical unification of the Islamic community.
Part 3: From an "Islamic" Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to the 
Negara Islam Indonesia
The 1940s marked a watershed in the Indies' political environment, as in March 
1942 the Japanese Army landed on Java, bringing to an end three centuries of Dutch 
presence in the archipelago. Japanese rule, although brief, was as important for 
Indonesia's future as for the development of Kartosuwiryo's political strategy. Japan 
inverted the Dutch approach of "regarding Indonesian politics as a troublesome 
irritation,"50 envisaging instead a drastic change in the way the local administration 
was run. On the political scene, the Japanese presence brought forward actions aimed 
at the elimination of Western influences in Asia, with the goal of building the Greater 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Since Indies Muslims had been exposed to years of anti- 
Western propaganda, stirred by calls to support Islam, and impressed by Japan's many 
recent military victories, they perceived the Japanese as liberators, and its reforms in 
the field of party politics were received with great enthusiasm.51 The PSII leadership,
48 Kartosuwiryo, "Daftar-Oesaha," in Al-Chaidar, Pemikimn Politik, p. 437.
49 Ibid.
50 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944—1946 (Ithaca, NY, 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 31.
51 See M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955); and Harry Jindrich 
Benda, The Crescent and Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945 (The Hague:
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for example, interpreted the order to dismantle all political parties and organizations 
as a sign of the Japanese government's genuine interest in making Indonesian 
nationalists stronger, by unifying their deeply fragmented front.52 53Similarly, Japan's 
agenda to see Asians ruling in the region earned it a warm welcome in the Indies. In 
August 1942, PSII president Wondoamiseno commented on the recent Japanese arrival 
as an event to be thankful to God about; the brave sacrifice of the Japanese Empire (Dai 
Nippon) had freed the Indonesian people from 340 years of Dutch colonization, and
... had lifted it from the mud of subjugation and humiliation [...] now there is no 
more ethnic differentiation, everyone is equal, this is the blessing of the 
leadership and protection of our brother Japan.55
In late September 1943, another Islamic leader wrote in Asia Raya that the final aim of 
the Indonesian people was
... the fulfillment of the duty to defend themselves as an Asiatic race, to defend 
religion, sovereignty, and justice as Muslims, and to support the realization of 
Hakko Itjoe ["the world one house"] as ordained by Allah.54
Kartosuwiryo was equally enthusiastic about this regime change, as shown in his 
articles published in the bi-monthly magazine Soeara MIA1 throughout 1943."" The most 
striking feature of these articles is Kartosuwiryo's cooperative approach to the new 
authority, as it appears that he was attracted by the thought that Dai Nippon's ideal of 
a doenia baroe could be shaped into an Islamic state. This vision pushed Kartosuwiryo 
to shift his outward attention away from the Middle East and towards Asia. His first 
pledge in support of Dai Nippon appears in Bekal Bathin dalam Perjuangan, published 
on March 1, 1943. In this article, Kartosuwiryo argues for Japan's "earnest endeavor 
[to] the common welfare and prosperity of Greater East Asia," and calls upon the 
Muslim community of Java to lend its material support in such a struggle. Within a 
few months, the concept of zaman baroe (new era) was expanded by Kartosuwiryo to 
embrace the project of a "new world" comprising the whole East Asian region.56 By 
mid-May 1943, Kartosuwiryo proclaimed that cooperation with the Dai Nippon was 
wajib (religious duty) for all Muslims, and that the establishment of a Keloearga Asia- 
Timoer-Raya (Greater East Asia Family) was to be pursued as the final step of the 
gradual Islamization of the whole of society, a process that begins with the family, and
W. van Hoeve, 1958). For additional details on the bureaucratic transition, see Shigeru Sato, War, 
Nationalism, and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945, ed. Asian Studies Association of 
Australia (St. Leonard's: Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 22—45. For additional details on mobilization, see Sato, 
War, Nationalism, and Peasants, pp. 36-59; and Anderson, java in a Time of Revolution, pp. 16-34.
52 Letter of PSII President W. Wondoamiseno to L.A.P.S.I.I. Pare-Pare and Teteadji, Surabaya [August 6, 
2602 JIY/1942 CE], Archief van de Procureur-Generaal Nederlands-Indies [hereafter APG] no. 1007, NA.
53 Ibid.
54 Words of Muhammad Zain Djambek, quoted in M. Slamet, The Holy War "Made in Japan," vol. II, 
Japanese Machinations series (Batavia [Jakarta]: np, 1946), pp. 12-13.
55 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Bekal Bathin dalam Perjuangan," Soeara Ml AT (henceforth SMI AT), March 1,1943; 
"Menoedjoe ke Arah Dar-oel-Islam dan Dar-oes-Salam," SMIA1, March 15,1943; "Fardl-oel-Ain dan Fardl- 
oel-Kifajah dalam Islam," SMIAI, May 1,1943; "Kewadjiban Oemmat Islam Menghadapi 'Doenia Baroe,"' 
SMIAI, May 15,1943; "Baitoel-Mal pada zaman Pantjaroba and Tarich Bait-al-mal zaman Rasoeloellah elm 
dan choelafa-oer-rasidin r.a.a.," SMIAI, June 28,1943; "I'tibar Madjazy dan Ma'any" SMIAI, July 15,1943; 
and "Benteng Islam" SMIAI, September 1, 2603 JIY/1943 CE.
56 Kartosuwiryo, "Fardl- oel-Ain dan Fardl-oel-Kifajah," SMIAI, May 1, 2603 JIY /1943 CE.
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reaches up to the neighborhood, the village, and the world. At this stage, however, the 
scope of Kartosuwiryo's idea of an Islamic front (Benteng Islam) was limited to the 
building of companionship (mushahabah) and brotherhood (oekhoewwah) among all 
layers and sections of the greater East Asian population in order to ensure the success 
of the co-prosperity sphere. It had become evident that Kartosuwiryo was imagining 
this Doenia Baroe in Islamic terms, as a bridge towards the after-life (Dar al-Akhirat),57 58a 
vision he reiterated once again in September when he described this "new world" of 
the Keloearga Asia-Timoer-Raya, achieved through the struggle of pure Muslims, as a 
reflection of the Dar-oel-Islam.5S Keeping in focus his final goal of living in a society that 
fully followed Islamic rules—at the individual as much as at the administrative and 
legal levels—Kartosuwiryo interpreted the Dai Nippon's project to build a pan-Asian 
state in combination with its inclination towards Islam. It appears that the fact that 
neither most Japanese nor the majority of the Asian population followed Islam was not 
perceived by Kartosuwiryo as an obstacle towards the creation of an Islamic "Greater 
East Asia Family."
National Interests Prevail
With the capitulation of Japanese forces in August 1945, the subsequent SEAC 
(South East Asia Command) landing, and the eventual reinstatement of Dutch colonial 
rule, the initial efforts to transform Indonesia into an independent state failed. 
Nonetheless, the Indonesian population now had strong and solid citizens' 
organizations, and opposition to the Dutch authority was fierce. In the mid-1940s, 
Indonesia was on its own in the struggle against the Netherlands' colonial ambitions: 
plans to recreate a caliphate had been long since abandoned, as pan-Arabism and pure 
nationalism dominated the scene in the Middle East; pan-Asianism had collapsed 
under the weight of the Allied forces; and socialist internationalists had suffered a 
heavy blow with the dissolution of the Third International. All that Indonesian 
politicians were left with was their desire to be independent, and so their attention 
turned to domestic priorities.
The changed international political context was reflected in Kartosuwiryo's 
writings. At a regional level, Kartosuwiryo was still a prominent party leader in West 
Java, his chosen constituency since 1930. At the national level, he was nominated 
secretary of the executive committee of Masyumi in November 1945; in the following 
year, he became a party delegate for the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP, 
Central Indonesian National Committee), and at its second assembly in Malang 
(February-March 1947), he was chosen by KNIP's president to be one of the forty-two 
members of the Badan Pekerja (Working Committee).59 Kartosuwiryo's willingness to 
participate in parliamentary politics led him to be very controlled in his statements, 
and the contingent circumstances pushed him to focus on national politics. 
Kartosuwiryo's restraint did not last long, however. Following the Dutch military
57 Kartosuwiryo, "Kewadjiban Oemmat Islam Menghadapi 'Doenia Baroe/" SMI At, May 15, 2603 JIY /1943 
CE.
58 Kartosuwiryo, "Benteng Islam," SMIAI, September 1, 2603 JIY/1943 CE.
59 See "Sidang Badan Pekerdja K.N.I.Poesat," Merdeka, March 27,1947; and Deliar Noer and Akbarsyah, 
K.N.I.P.: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat. Parlemen Indonesia 1945-1959 (Jakarta: Yayasan Risalah, 2005), p. 
396.
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attack on West Java in July 1947, Kartosuwiryo refused the position of minister of 
defense in the Republic's government and instead returned to West Java to lead the 
anti-Dutch resistance.60
In August 1946, the Priangan regional Masyumi Information Office (Dewan 
Penerangan Masyumi Daerah Priangan) published one of Kartosuwiryo's speeches, 
which had been delivered in Garut the previous month, and which was titled 
"Haloean Politik Islam" (The Goal of Political Islam). This pamphlet offers a clear view 
of Masyumi's political agenda, and, more importantly, it provides a detailed vision of 
the party's strategy to achieve independence and to ensure a relevant role for Islam in 
the future nation-state. As the possibility that communism, socialism, or nationalism 
could rise to political ascendancy was not excluded, Kartosuwiryo argued that, during 
the revolution, the ummah should strive to build a "new world" in full conformity with 
the Qur'an—that is, to build a Doenia Islam, Dar-oel-Islam, or ad-daulatul Islamiyah. It is 
worth noting that in this pamphlet there are no more references to the outside world, 
and the Doenia Baroe/ Dar-oel-Islam vision—which in the 1930s and early 1940s was 
comprehended as an Islamic political entity spreading beyond the territorial borders of 
the Indonesian archipelago—appears to be understood only in nationalistic terms. At 
this point in time, Kartosuwiryo was deeply concerned with the unity of the anti­
colonial front, hence he not only supported the "parliamentary way" to establish an 
Islamic state, but also strongly condemned fanaticism, as it "easily threatenjed] the 
unity of the nation [persatoean bangsa] and of the struggle, [and] resulted] in splits and 
betrayals that are especially unwished for in these times when all citizens ought to feel 
obliged to join the National Revolution."61 62
In 1946, Kartosuwiryo was thus actively fomenting a national revolution aimed at 
winning independence from foreign domination. The fight for independence was 
expressed in terms of revolution and jihad, with the "greater struggle" of the soul 
against worldly desires and foreign influences—corresponding to the social and 
individual revolutions—playing a primary role in comparison to the "lesser struggle," 
or armed national revolution. In contrast to the vocabulary he used in the 1920-30s, 
now Kartosuwiryo declared that the duty and responsibility of each Muslim was to 
defend and build national sovereignty, instead of striving for the unity of the Oemmat 
Islam se-Doenia.b2
As the Dutch pursued their post-WWII goals, their first "police action" in July 1947 
resulted in the invasion of the republican territory of West Java. Consequently, 
Kartosuwiryo's take on politics became increasingly focused on Indonesia and West 
Java. In the Priangan area, Masyumi and its armed militias, Hizboellah and Sabilillah 
(established under Japanese patronage in 1944), were enjoying ever-increasing support 
from the population. This was in part because the militias' actions were more effective 
than those pursued by the regular republican administration and the Tentara Negara 
Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian National Army). This situation led the head of the
60 "Het Republikeinsche Kabinet Sjarifuddin, IV Kabinet 3 Juli 1947"; "Kabinet Sjarifuddin Ve Kabinet (4 
Juli 1947-23 Jan 1948)" and "Kabinet—Sjarifuddin Ve Kabinet (na wijziging op 11-11-1947)" in APG 
no.731, NA.; and "Soesoenan Kabinet Baroe," Merdeka, July 4,1947.
61 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, Haloean Politik Islam (Garut: Dewan Penerangan Masjoemi, 1946), p. 14.
62 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, Haloean Politik Islam.
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republican police in Tasikmalaya to notice that, in December 1947, "Masyumi in the 
Priangan increasingly resembled an independent government."63
With the United States as mediator, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic 
reached what is called the Renville agreement, signed in January 1948, which 
established that West Java should become a Dutch-controlled area, thus free of 
Indonesian military presence. It was decided that the deadline for troop evacuation 
was the end of February 1948; Colonel Nasution led 22,000 men of the TNI Siliwangi 
division out of the region,64 yet it was clear that most militias were not going to 
withdraw. The separation of West Java from the republican territory, and the presence 
of Hizboellah and Sabilillah fighters beyond the Renville agreement's van Mook line, 
which defined territorial sovereignty in Java, have to be considered crucial factors in 
determining why Darul Islam and the Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Army of 
Indonesia) formed in the first months of 1948. According to Dutch sources, 
Kartosuwiryo, reacting to the evident implications of the Renville agreement, called for 
a conference to undertake the reorganization of West Java's Masyumi constituency as 
early as the end of 1947.65
Following the signing of the Renville agreement, two more meetings were 
organized in West Java that prepared the ground for the formation of the Darul Islam 
movement. One conference was arranged in Pangwedusan, Cisayong, on February 10- 
11, and a second one took place in Cirebon on March l .66 *On this latter occasion, 
Kartosuwiryo and his Estates General created the political and military structures 
needed to confront Dutch authority. First, they declared the dissolution of Masyumi's 
organization and activities in West Java, as the current political agreements between 
the Republic and the Dutch had put the regional branch of Masyumi in an untenable 
situation. '' Second, the various militias were merged to form a unified army, Tentara
63 "Kantor Polisi Tasikmalaya, perihal Politieke situasi" [December 9,1947], Arsip Kepolisian Negara 
Republik Indonesia no. 495, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta [hereafter ANRI].
64 Abdul Haris Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 2 vols. (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1968); and Merle 
Calvin Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C.1200, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 227.
65 According to "Territoriaal ts.Troepencommandant West Java Afd.Generale Staf Bureau I.V.D.
No.G.355/ 200 Re Negara Islam" [June 12,1948], APG no.997, NA, this meeting happened in September 
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Divisie '7 December' Staf 3e Inf.Brig.Groep Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst No. IV-P/ bb— 
Geheim/Persoonlijk, Madjelis Oemat Islam" [August 12,1948], APG no.997, NA; and "De Daroel Islam- 
beweging in West-Java. CMI publicatie no. 91" [September 29,1948], Archief van het Algemene Secretarie 
Nederlands-Indische no.3977, NA.
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Sejarah, Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, 1982), pp. 59-65. Details on the events that led to the 
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Islam Indonesia, that would operate from the west side of the van Mook line.68 The aim 
of this army was to: "in a tactful way attain local control, succeed in taking power from 
the Republic, and include [its territory] within the Islamic state."69 Third, the 
Kartosuwiryo group's political agenda was to revolve around the need to establish a 
Negara Baroe, also identified as a democratic Islamic state. It is clear that, at this point, 
Kartosuwiryo's only concern was to create an Islamic state in the western part of Java, 
and future expansion to the republican territories was only an alternative in case the 
republican government in Yogyakarta was to be dissolved.70
Part 4: The Nil's Promotion of a Worldwide Federation of Islamic States
The situation created by the Renville agreement was further aggravated by the 
Dutch army's second "aggression." On December 19, 1948, the Dutch army invaded 
Central Java, entered Yogyakarta, and captured the republican cabinet. President 
Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta, Prime Minister Sjahrir, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Agus Salim, and several others were held captive while the Dutch seized control of all 
major cities in Java and Sumatra, imposed censorship, and limited the movements of 
the UN-led Committee of Good Offices. This event was a serious setback to the process 
of creating an independent state of Indonesia. The Dutch were aiming at establishing 
de facto authority, and this situation pushed Kartosuwiryo further to pursue his project 
for an Islamic State. As the international community's pressure on the Dutch 
government soared, the latter was forced to release the cabinet officials as well as 
accelerate the process to transfer sovereignty. This transition was eventually regulated 
by the Rum-Van Royen Statement, signed on May 7, 1949, which sanctioned the 
formation of a federal state of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS), under the 
symbolic leadership of the Dutch Queen, by December 31, 1949.71 Kartosuwiryo 
reacted to this turn of events by proclaiming the creation of the Negara Islam 
Indonesia (Nil) on August 7, 1949, and, two weeks later, releasing his political 
Manifesto.
The text of the Nil Proclamation does not provide many details, but it presents 
several of the fundamental aspects of Kartosuwiryo's political stand. The text is said to 
have been drafted in the basic unit of this Islamic state, Madinah Indonesia—a name 
reminiscent of Muhammad's hijrah from Mecca to Medina and his subsequent 
establishment of an Islamic "nation" there—and it identifies this state as a Negara 
Karunia Allah (State Granted from God), or ad-daulat-al-Islamiyah (Islamic government), 
and a Darul Islam (Abode of Islam). This proclamation was to be recognized across the 
world, "because the ummat Islam Bangsa Indonesia is convinced that the moment has 
already arrived to pursue this holy duty, to guard the safety of the Nil, and for its
65 "Rencana Ketenteraan Oemmat Islam" [March 1,1948], DjogjaDoc no.218h, ANRI.
69 "Dunia Masyumi" [March 1,1948], DjogjaDoc no.218h, ANRI.
70 "Program Politik Ummat Islam" [March 1,1948], DjogjaDoc no.218h, ANRI.
71 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1969), pp. 332-50. An interesting account of these events and of the reactions of the international 
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population to look after the sanctity of religion, and especially to 'establish God's 
Justice in the World.'"72 73
Although there were some hints regarding a potential transnational dimension of 
the NII in the Proklamasi, no open statement was made in this direction until the 
"Manifesto Politik I/7" was released in late August 1949. There were two aspects of 
this pamphlet that make it relevant to Kartosuwiryo's transnational aspirations for the 
NII, as it mentions both a worldwide revolution, and the spread of the Islamic state. 
Kartosuwiryo argued that it was only through a third world war, "more devastating 
and violent than the previous ones," that the national revolution could be transformed 
into a World Revolution (Revoloesi Doenia).73 The idea that a third world war would 
favor the holy struggle of Muslims around the world had been suggested by 
Kartosuwiryo for the first time in November 1948, but it was not until the Manifesto 
was drafted that he expressed a clear vision of how such an event would affect political 
developments in Indonesia and in the wider Islamic world.74 75
The World Revolution is seen as the fourth phase of the transition from colonial 
dominion to Islamic state: the first phase was represented by the initial rebellion of the 
Indonesian ummah in the Priangan; the second phase had begun after the proclamation 
of the NII in August 1949, which had annihilated the concept of an Indonesian 
Republic and had established a degree of Islamic rule in some areas of Java. 
(Kartosuwiryo's expectation for some major international event to trigger a third world 
war emerges clearly in the pamphlet, as such an event was necessary to trigger the 
following phases.) Phase three was characterized by the gradual introduction of 
Islamic law in other areas of the archipelago, thus empowering the NII to a level that 
would allow for its de facto sovereignty over an extended region, while phase four 
aimed at the establishment of the Negara Karunia Allah, or Negara Islam Indonesia. 
Although this Negara Karunia Allah is still defined as the Islamic State of Indonesia, the 
different territorial scope of the NII in phases two and four is clear. In this last stage, 
the Indonesian ummah was to cultivate international relations that, with time, would 
become increasingly organic until the formation of a single Negara Karunia Allah.75 This 
approach suggests that this Islamic state was to evolve from a regional dimension to a 
national and then international one, and eventually make a last "qualitative" step 
towards transnationality.
It is safe to state that Kartosuwiryo himself was unclear on the relationship 
between his Negara and the wider Islamic world. What transpires, however, is an 
(understandable) eagerness to make his NII into the core of a borderless, transnational 
Islamic state established through the efforts of the ummah. It should not be forgotten 
that in 1947 Pakistan had become separated from India, Abu 'Ala al-Mawdudi's 
articles were still calling for pan-Islam, and al-Banna's Ikhwani ideology still enjoyed 
support and was gaining traction throughout the Middle East. An Indonesian army 
booklet, published in 1974, shed additional light on the NII's attempt to expand its
72 "Proklamasi berdirinja Negara Islam Indonesia" [August 7, 1949], Penumpasan DI-JaBar [hereafter DI 
Jabar] no. 14, Arsip Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, [hereafter ABRI].
73 S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Manifesto Politik Negara Islam Indonesia No. 1 / 7" (1949), Chapter VI, point 1.
74 "Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no.3" [1 Muharram 1368 AH./November 2, 1948, CE], DI Jabar 
[folii], ABRI.
75 Kartosuwiryo, "Manifesto Politik," Chapter VIII, pp. 6-9; and Chapter IX, pp. 7-10.
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influence. From the documents presented in this booklet, it emerges that, in the 1950s, 
connections were to be forged between nation-states, and no longer between Islamic 
communities. As the Darul Islam-Negara Islam Indonesia spread to the outer regions 
of the archipelago—Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan—its administrative 
structure came to include a vie e-imam for foreign affairs, and an "ambassador abroad," 
so to conform with the new expansionist approach of the NIL These two positions 
were filled by the Darul Islam-Aceh leaders Daud Beureueh and Hasan Tiro, 
respectively."
The 1974 report also republished documentation released by the Chief Prosecutor 
(Jaksa Tinggi) mentioning that Kartosuwiryo's efforts were directed towards the 
creation of a Perserikatan Negara-Negara Islam Seluruh Dunia (Federation of Islamic 
States across the World). This is reminiscent of Kartosuwiryo's 1936 Sikap Hidjrah 
pamphlet. However, the shift of focus from ummah to negara suggests a fundamental 
change from transnationalism to internationalism, from the vision of a single 
borderless Islamic state to a federation of Islamic nation-states. The report also explains 
how this union was to be achieved in seven stages. Following the establishment of the 
Nil, the Negara basis (Madinah Indonesia) in the Bandung region had to consolidate itself 
militarily; in the meantime, Hasan Tiro would be working on an agreement with the 
republican government to limit its sovereignty and shape the ad-daulat al-Islamiyah. The 
Nil also had to be consolidated internally, in order to achieve the strongest position in 
Asia, and then begin an outward process to connect with other nations that had 
already returned their governments to the rule of Qur'an and Hadith, such as Egypt, 
Pakistan, and Malaysia. The Nil was also to support Islamic rebellions across the 
world, following the example of the Ikhwanul Muslimln. When this was all in place, 
the Perserikatan would be framed within pan-Islam and shaped in a cooperative body 
called Dewan Khalifatullah Fil'ardi (Council of the Representatives of God on Earth).76 7 
Finally, a short note in an archival document also mentions that, in the early 1950s, 
Kahar Muzhakkar, Darul Islam leader in South Sulawesi, had sent a delegation to the 
Sulu islands in the Philippines to lay out the foundations of an Islamic state there.78
In 1950, Kartosuwiryo stated that the Nil represented the implementation of 
"God's will on Earth,"79 and on the tenth anniversary of the Nil's proclamation, in
76 Prihantoro, Penumpasan, pp. 80-81. Daud Beureueh and Hasan Tiro continued to lead the Islamic 
struggle in Aceh and on the international stage, respectively; however, while Beureueh stressed the 
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ibid., p. 75.
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with the central committee of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1950, during which he "was struck by a vivid 
interest in the West Java Darul Islam movement—interest supported by a good deal of rather detailed 
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1959, he declared himself Khalifatullah dan Khalifatan Nabi (Representative of God and 
Representative of the Prophet) in the Indonesian archipelago.80 What is interesting 
about this self-proclamation is that it appears to be in contrast with the popular 
understanding of Kartosuwiryo's position as Nil's Imam. According to Sjarifuddin, the 
author of one of Kartosuwiryo's early biographies, Kartosuwiryo's followers believed 
that he had received the Wahyu Cakraningrat Sadar, a divine revelation that bestowed 
on him the title of Khalifatullah seluruh ummat manusia, or "representative of God to the 
entire Islamic community," without the "territorial" limitation of the Indonesian 
archipelago.811 would like to suggest that the discrepancy between the popular belief 
and Kartosuwiryo's self-appointment was a product of his own leadership style. To his 
followers, Kartosuwiryo was the Imam, the only leader of the Islamic community—kita 
hanja mengenal satu Ulil Amri Islam, satu Imam-Panglima T.A.P.N.I.I., tidak lebih, dan tidak 
kurangf2 But, as he projected himself to the outer Islamic world, Kartosuwiryo 
presented himself as a regional leader for an international—rather than transnational— 
Islamic state.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have traced the ever-changing and nuanced attitude of 
Kartosuwiryo towards pan-Islam and religious nationalism. The problematic 
relationship between these two trends has already been discussed in the context of the 
late-colonial Middle East by Landau and Nikki Keddie, and for the contemporary 
Saudi Salafi movement by Madawi al-Rasheed.83 This paper is a first attempt to analyze 
pan-Islam and religious nationalism's origins and impact on political Islam in 
Indonesia in the first half of the twentieth century. The spread of the pan-Islamic ideal 
in the Indies has been presented here in the context of the "decline" of political Islam in 
the Indies, and by looking at the historical events that culminated in the abrogation of 
the Ottoman caliphate in the mid-1920s, which further stimulated the debate on the 
organization of the Islamic ummah worldwide. In this article, I have argued that pan- 
Islam emerged, first, as a pivotal element of Sarekat Islam propaganda in the 1920-30s, 
as this feeling of communal belonging and struggle united Muslims of varying 
ideological orientations; however, pan-Islam also emerged as a distinctive feature of 
Kartosuwiryo's writings in those circumstances where appeals to international and 
transnational dimensions of Islam supported domestic political goals. A clear example 
has been the combination of post-caliphate debates and the fragmentation of the 
Sarekat Islam party.
In his first articles in 1928-29, Kartosuwiryo wrote that commitment to the pan- 
Islamic ideal was a viable ideology to achieve international cooperation among 
Muslims who were working towards the independence of their own countries. By
80 "Ma'lumat Komandemen Tertinggi no. 11," S. M. Kartosuwiryo, Mardlatillah, August 7,1959, in Al- 
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1930, however, the Sarekat Islam party's constitution stated, instead, that the unity of 
the Indonesian ummah was a step towards the unity of the Islamic community 
worldwide. Kartosuwiryo's 1936 Sikap Hidjrah pamphlet envisaged Islamic 
brotherhood across nations as a means to unify the entire Islamic ummah, and he 
reconfirmed this aspiration in 1940, so that on the eve of the Japanese invasion the 
unity of Indonesian Muslims was still seen as just part of unifying the entire Islamic 
world, of creating a new world (i.e., the Doenia Islam or Darnel Islam). Japanese 
administrators were successful in leading religious leaders to read the Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere project in Islamic terms, and Kartosuwiryo also adhered to 
this vision, stating that the keloearga Asia Timoer Raya was a Darnel Islam. In the greater 
scheme of things, however, this accommodation with the Japanese represented a 
reduction of the Darul Islam project to an Asian regional perspective.
This long-lasting commitment to an outward-oriented Islamic state—whether this 
be across the Muslim world or across Asia—was eventually halted by the Dutch 
return, which instigated a shift in focus. Kartosuwiryo and other political leaders 
further narrowed their ambitions to the creation of an Indonesian nation-state 
independent of foreign rule. The territorial scope of the Doenia Baroe/Darnel Islam was 
first scaled down to the borders of the Netherlands East Indies, and, with the 1948 
Renville agreement, it scaled down even further to West Java, with Kartosuwiryo's 
expansionist desires limited to the Indonesian Archipelago. After the proclamation of 
Negara Islam Indonesia in 1949, tensions with the Indonesian Republic increased, and 
Kartosuwiryo's state became—for some—symbolic of Islamic opposition to the 
Pancasila state. Kartosuwiryo's Manifesto Politik appealed once again to the ummah, and 
suggested a political progression from West Java to the Islamic world, focusing on both 
inter-state and inter-community connections. As the Nil expanded to Aceh, South 
Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan, the Islamic state's leaders began to look at the wider 
Islamic world. As relations between the Nil and the Republic of Indonesia deteriorated 
through the 1950s, inter-state relations were deemed the apt strategy to form the 
Negara Karunia Allah and a "worldwide union of Islamic states" that would eventually 
establish the Khalifatullah Fil'ardi within the structure of an Islamic federation of nation­
states.
The rationale behind the shifting prioritization of pan-Islam over nationalism, and 
internationalism over transnationalism, between the 1920s and the 1950s, is left 
unanswered by the sources, as neither Kartosuwiryo nor the PSII directorate ever 
deemed it necessary to explain the logic behind their policies. Nonetheless, throughout 
the historical analysis of these complex relations, I have highlighted the connections 
between appeals to an external, self-standing, sanctified aim and periods of political 
crisis in the Indonesian Islamic movement. Projecting the local struggle towards the 
establishment of a broader Darul Islam, or ad-daulat-ul-Islamiyah, provided additional 
motivation and strength to the Indonesian ummah, regardless of who the enemy was. 
Thus, I conclude that the goal of creating an international union of Islamic nation-states 
shifted to one of unifying a transnational Islamic community not because of pure 
ideological intents, but because of surrounding historical circumstances.
